DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 230 657 UD 022 815

AUTHOR Hannon, James T.
TITLE The Influence of Catholic Schools on the Desegregation of Public School Systems: A Case Study of White Flight in Boston.
INSTITUTION Wisconsin Univ., Madison. Center for Demography and Ecology.
SPONS AGENCY Wisconsin Center for Education Research, Madison.; Wisconsin Univ., Madison. Inst. for Research on Poverty.
REPORT NO CDE-WP-82-45
PUB DATE 82
NOTE 28p.; Research was conducted as part of a national study of public school desegregation directed by Dr. Karl E. Taeuber.
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - General (140)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Catholic Schools; *Church Role; *Desegregation Effects; Migration; Public Schools; Racial Composition; School Community Relationship; *School Desegregation; *Transfer Policy; Transfer Students; *Whites
IDENTIFIERS *Massachusetts (Boston)

ABSTRACT

White flight from public schools to avoid desegregation can result in educational and residential resegregation, defeating the purpose of desegregation efforts. One form of white flight is pupil transfer to private schools, which in most metropolitan areas are predominantly Catholic. Unlike residential relocation, transfers to Catholic schools constitute less permanent loss to the public school system than that caused by relocation. However, empty seats in area Catholic schools pose a threat to the success of any desegregation program. Hence, the issue of white flight creates a complex conflict of interests for the Catholic diocese, torn between institutional self-interest and competing claims to moral principles and Church teachings. A study of the effects of desegregation efforts in Boston, Massachusetts, schools shows that approximately 2,000 students, accounting for 20 percent of the white students, transferred to Catholic schools from the public system. An analysis of political and institutional constraints on policy development and implementation provides a basis for predicting future response by the Church to desegregation programs. Church members and officials who desire a supportive and consistent desegregation policy must confront head on the problems outlined above. At the national level, the Church must both strive for transfer policies which restrict white flight from desegregated public schools, and accelerate efforts to increase minority enrollment in Catholic schools. (AOS)

**********
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
**********

Center For Demography And Ecology
University of Wisconsin-Madison

ED230657

# THE INFLUENCE OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS ON THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY OF WHITE FLIGHT IN BOSTON

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
James T. Hannon
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

James T. Hannon

CDE Working Paper 82-45

UD022815

# The Influence of Catholic Schools on the Desegregation of Public School Systems: A Case Study of White Flight in Boston


## ABSTRACT

White flight from public school desegregation can result in educational and residential resegregation which defeat the purpose of desegregation programs. One form of white flight is pupil transfer to private schools, which in major metropolitan areas are predominantly Catholic schools. Unlike residential relocation, transfers to Catholic schools do not effect an increase in residential segregation and they constitute a potentially less permanent loss to the public system than that caused by relocation. Nevertheless, empty seats in area Catholic schools pose a threat to the success of any desegregation program. For the Catholic diocese the white flight issue creates a complex conflict of interests, involving institutional self-interest and competing claims to moral principles and Church teachings.

The case study of Boston indicates that approximately 2,000 students transferred to Catholic schools from the public system, accounting for over 20% of white pupil loss to the public system. This occurred despite diocesan policies designed to prevent white flight to Catholic schools. An analysis of political and institutional constraints on policy development and implementation provides a basis for predicting Church response to future desegregation programs in other locations. Suggestions for diocesan programs designed to address desegregation issues are included.


* * * * *


This research was conducted as part of a national study of public school desegregation directed by Dr. Karl E. Taeuber. Funding was provided by the Institute for Research on Poverty and the Wisconsin Center for Education Research, both at UW-Madison. I wish to thank Dr. Taeuber for facilitating this particular study and for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Mary J. McDonald and Roger Hedge of the Massachusetts Department of Education and Rev. Eugene Sullivan, Superintendent of Schools of the Archdiocese of Boston. Conclusions and interpretations presented here are the sole responsibility of the author.


Please direct all comments and inquiries to the author at Dept. of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Dr., Madison, WI 53706.

The Influence of Catholic Schools on the Desegregation of Public School Systems: A Case Study of White Flight in Boston

Much of the criticism directed against the use of mandatory busing to achieve school desegregation has focused on white flight and its resegregating effects on central city school systems (Coleman, Kelly and Moore, 1975; Ravitch, 1978; Armor, 1972, 1980). One element of the white flight critique has been the contention that mandatory busing not only removes white students from urban public school systems but also increases residential segregation through the relocation of white families who move out of the district, usually to suburbs unaffected by desegregation orders (Armor, 1980: 219-223).

Because of this contention, an important element of the white flight equation is the extent of pupil transfers from public schools to private schools during the critical first few years of desegregation. Such transfers have no effect on residential segregation and are also less likely than residential relocations to result in permanent withdrawals from the public school system. This is so for two reasons: the high cost of private schools and the relative ease of transferring back to the public system if central city residence has been maintained (Farley, 1975: 19, 1976).

Outside the South, where segregation academies have been the destination of most who have left desegregated school systems, the vast majority of private schools are Catholic schools (Clotfelter, 1976). An examination of the role of these schools in the history of desegregation in Boston provides evidence of the proportion of white flight attributable to Catholic schools in that city. It can also reveal some of the political and organizational dynamics which





determine Church response to public school desegregation. An understanding of these dynamics may assist planners and advocates who must anticipate the influence of Catholic schools in cities which still await desegregation.

Desegregation: Church Response and Community Reaction

In Boston the potential for white flight, both transfers and relocations, was quite high. Many of the characteristics which have been associated with white flight were present: a large, urban school district with a significant proportion of minority students (42%), a high proportion of Catholics among the white population, overwhelmingly white suburban school districts, a desegregation plan limited to the central city, and a significant proportion of white students assigned to the busing program (see Giles, Gatlin and Cataldo, 1974; Pettigrew and Green, 1976; Clotfelter, 1976, 1979; Farley, Richards and Wurdock, 1980). Geographically, conditions were also conducive. The city of Boston is relatively small in relation to the metropolitan area (see Appendix I) and many suburbs are easily accessible by public transportation. In addition, the Catholic school system is very large and a ten year history of declining enrollments meant many empty seats in the schools which were still open. (see Table 1).

(Table 1 about here)

On June 21, 1974 Federal Judge Arthur J. Garrity ordered the implementation of the first phase of the Court's desgregation plan



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

to take effect with the beginning of the coming school year in September 1974. In February 1974 the Board of Education of the Archdiocese of Boston, in anticipation and support of the court order, announced a very controversial decision to severely restrict transfers into Catholic schools in the coming school year. The implementation of this transfer policy with the beginning of public school desegregation and busing in September produced bitter protest from Catholic parents of public school students. Parent groups in Hyde Park and South Boston, centers of anti-busing sentiment, organized a boycott of all charities connected in any way with the Archbishop of Boston, Humberto Cardinal Medeiros. When the Archdiocesan school office canvassed affected principals and pastors in December 1974, half of them also expressed serious dissatisfaction and a belief that the policy violated the natural rights of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools (Hannon, 1980).

Church officials were not unaware of the extent of popular opposition. In January 1975 the Archdiocesan Board of Education relaxed the transfer guidelines for the next school year, beginning in September 1975. The new policy allowed transfers as long as their admission would contribute to racial balance within a school or otherwise fill vacancies which had developed "through normal patterns such as transfer or drop out." This meant that school principals could use transfer students to prevent further enrollment declines and possible school closings. Given the consistent history of declining enrollments, this policy did promise more, though not unlimited, opportunities for students who in September would seek alternatives to an increasingly troubled public school system.





This liberalization of the transfer policy was received with serious criticism in the liberal press and minority community. After years of protracted struggle with a determined, anti-busing school committee, these pro-desegregation forces had finally gained an effective desegregation order. They fully expected complete support of that order and its intent from the religious institutions and religious leaders who had supported the concept of desegregation throughout that long effort.

The pro-desegregation forces had already expressed displeasure with the degree of enforcement of the initial transfer policy. During the first weeks of the 1974-75 school year, reporters of the Boston Globe, the city's major daily newspaper, had interviewed students and teachers at Catholic schools in Boston and its near suburbs. These reporters had concluded that despite the transfer policy many public school students from Boston had managed to transfer to these schools. Fully aware that such transfers served to resegregate the public system, desegregation supporters had accused Archdiocesan officials and local principals of strengthening the Catholic school system at the expense of the desegregation program. Although Church officials, including school superintendent Brother Bartholomew Varden, denied that numerous transfers had been accepted, many Bostonians remained convinced that the original transfer policy had proven sufficiently flexible as to undermine desegregation.

In this context desegregation proponents viewed the formal relaxation of the transfer policy at the height of the community crisis as an inexcusable capitulation to institutional self-interest and/or the demands of reactionary and racist elements within the



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Church and larger community. At the same time, parents still unable to find places for their children in Catholic schools remained bitterly opposed to Church policy. Only a close examination of the results of both transfer policies, i.e., the extent of transfers to Catholic schools in the first few years of desegregation, can indicate the real effects of Church policies on the desegregation program. This examination of changes in enrollment figures also provides a basis for an analysis of the external and institutional variables which shaped the development and implementation of these policies.

Extent and Impact of Transfers to Catholic Schools

At the end of the first year of desegregation, in June 1975, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted a week-long public hearing in Boston to examine the progress of the desegregation program. One of the major issues was the extent of pupil transfers to Catholic schools.

John Bynoe of the New England Region of the Office for Civil Rights reported on the inchoate efforts of white parents to establish private schools as a refuge from desegregation. Bynoe testified that although no private schools had yet been established, "We did find that large numbers of the youngsters have shown up in parochial school systems, even though the Cardinal had asked that parochial systems not entertain youngsters to avoid desegregation" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975).

Thomas Atkins, a local representative of the NAACP, also reported an apparent failure of enforcement of the transfer policy:



> "With respect to religious organizations, there was a variegated response. The Catholic Archdiocese, under the leadership of the Cardinal, early on issued a statement saying that the archdiocesan schools would not be allowed to become havens for those seeking to escape desegregation.
>
> The Cardinal, to his credit, stuck by that position, even though, as I understand it, there were numerous parishes which worked actively to undermine the position taken by the Cardinal and did, in fact, admit students fleeing the Boston school system" (U.S.C.C.R, 1975).

These testimonies and public opinion in Boston contradicted the statements of the Church leaders who maintained, even at this hearing, that there had been little transfer activity. School Superintendent Varden supported his statement to that effect with enrollment figures which showed that "the overall enrollment in Catholic schools in the city of Boston in 1974-75 as compared with 1973/74 declined slightly." He also testified that suburban enrollments had increased slightly at the secondary level but decreased slightly at the elementary level.

In fact, these apparently conflicting sets of testimonies were both valid. Enrollments in the archdiocesan school system had not increased significantly. Nevertheless, significant numbers of transfers had occurred. This transfer trend was obscured by the statistics offered by Church officials. By equating "suburban" with the entire area of the archdiocese outside the city of Boston, in all a four-county area (see Appendix I), they allowed decreases in



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

enrollments in remote areas to balance increases in schools in Boston's near suburbs. Just as significant was the historical context. In a system which has suffered consistent enrollment declines for ten years, no decline in year eleven suggests the introduction of a new variable, which may have enhanced enrollments in three different ways. It may have produced larger entering cohorts (grades 1 and 9 in the Catholic system), reduced traditional rates of withdrawal, or triggered transfers into the system at all grade levels. In this case the new variable, public school desegregation, boosted Catholic school enrollments in all three ways.

Thus, for both geographical and historical reasons, aggregate enrollment figures do not provide an adequate basis for an analysis of the extent of white flight to Catholic schools. However, school level data are available for such an analysis, in the form of individual school reports, which private schools file every year with the State Department of Education. Prior to 1974, these reports contained enrollments for each grade by gender, white/non-white and resident/non-resident status. With the introduction of desegregation and mandatory busing, the Department of Education added more descriptive racial categories and a breakdown of students by town of residence. These additions were specifically designed to measure the extent of white flight. Because these more detailed statistics are not avilable for 1973, it is more difficult to measure student movements from 1973 to 1974 than for following years. Neverthless, individual school reports for 1973 and 1974 provide much more evidence than the aggregate figures reported at the USCCR hearing.





The Archdiocesan School Office adopted an overall enrollment increase of 5% at any particular school as indicative of apparent violation of the transfer policy. This was understood to be a rather crude standard which did not directly correspond to the provisions of the policy. To obtain a more accurate estimate of transfers, it is advisable to examine rates of cohort survival, a comparison of the number of students in one grade of a school in 1973 with the number in the next grade in 1974. If a school has thirty-five fifth grade students in 1973 and forty sixth-grade students in 1974, the 1974 survival ratio for grade six is 40/35 = 1.14. If the numbers are reversed, i.e., forty fifth-grade students in 1973 and thirty-five sixth grade students in 1974, the grade six survival ratio for 1974 is .88 (35/40). There are seven survival ratios for an elementary school for each year and three for each secondary school. Grade eight of 1973 can not be compared to any school's grade nine enrollment in 1974 because different schools and complex feeder patterns are involved.

A mean survival ratio (MSR) can be determined for each school for each year by computing the mean of the school's survival ratios - seven in an elementary school and three in each secondary school. In the computation of an MSR there is a statistical effect which gives greater weight to an increase in cohort size than to an equivalent decrease, e.g., 40/35 = 1.14 and 35/40 = .88. The mean of these two survival ratios is 1.01 although net change is 0. Although this statistical effect is significant only when there are significant gains for some cohorts and losses for others in the same school in the same year, it is advisable to use an MSR of 1.06 as indicative of a 5% mean increase in cohort size.



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

By defining an MSR of 1.06 as indicative of an apparent violation of the transfer policy, we can apply some control for enrollment histories and apply a more meaningful standard of compliance to individual Catholic schools. By the standard employed by the Archdiocesan school office, there were only three schools in apparent violation of the first transfer policy. The MSR method identifies 14 of 116 schools as in apparent violation.

It is possible to obtain an estimate of the total number of transfers by translating survival ratios into a number of unexpected or additional students whom we suspect to be transfer students from a Boston public school (see Table 2). To examine Mt. Alvernia, for example, the very high MSR results from an increase of eighty-nine students in grades 2-8 in 1974 compared to grades 1-7 in 1973. If the same calculation is made for all fourteen schools in apparent violation, the total of additional, or suspected transfer students is 535.

(table 2 about here)

This figure is an estimate of the Catholic school system's total number of accepted transfers from the Boston public schools in 1974. Its tendency to error is almost certainly toward underestimation. It does tend to overstate the number of transfer students at these fourteen schools because at least some of the additional students are probably from towns other than Boston. On the other hand, it does not include transfer students in the other 102 schools which accepted some transfers but not enough to acquire an MSR $\geq$ 1.06. Also, a history of declining enrollments in area





Catholic schools and a continued decline in the population of school-aged children in metropolitan Boston suggest that an MSR of even 1.00 would indicate a new variable in the enrollment equation, most likely the inmigration of transfer students (see Armor, 1980).

There is one other factor to consider in assessing the effectiveness of the transfer policy and the degree of compliance in Catholic schools. The desegregation plan in effect for 1974 only applied to certain sections of the city. Therefore, many white public school students had no immediate reason to seek admittance to a Catholic school. In September 1975 other sections of the city came under the busing plan. By that point, after a year of turmoil in the schools and community, the desire and pressure for admittance to Catholic schools had built and spread over the city and to the suburbs bordering newly-affected city neighborhoods.

The January 1975 revisions of the transfer policy had predictable effects. The relaxation of transfer guidelines resulted in twenty-six schools with MSRs $\geq$ 1.06. The MSR estimate of transfers to these twenty-six schools is 1,214 students, an increase of 679 (127%) over 1974. (see Table 3)

(Table 3 about here)

Individual school reports for both 1974 and 1975 contain records of enrollment by town of residence. Consequently, for 1975 we are able to compare MSR estimates of transfers with recorded increases in number of Boston residents in each school. The number of non-Boston residents in the city's schools is insignificant and shows no significant changes in this period, nor would we expect

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

such changes. For our purposes change in overall enrollment in Boston's Catholic schools can be equated with change in enrollment of Boston residents. From 1974 to 1975, increase in overall enrollment in Catholic schools in the city of Boston was 102. For the Catholic schools in Boston's eighteen near suburbs, enrollment of Boston residents increased by 1103. The total of additional Boston residents in Boston and suburban Catholic schools in 1975 is 1205.

This figure is very close to the transfer estimate of 1214 obtained by employing the MSR method. This agreement reinforces rather than dispels the impression that the MSR method produces a conservative estimate. Residence data on school reports will undercount transfers to the extent that either students or schools falsify residence information. It was common knowledge in Boston that by claiming suburban residence a public school student could increase his/her chances to gain admittance to a suburban school, perhaps the public school in that town, more likely a Catholic school in that town or in a neighboring suburb. Some Catholic schools thoroughly checked all transfer applications; others did not. The present chairperson of the Archdiocesan Board of Education, Dr. Patricia Goler, was vice chairperson in 1974 and 1975. In an interview conducted for this research Dr. Goler reported that during 1974 and 1975 Board members were certain that some principals were underreporting the number of Boston residents in their schools, though not total enrollments (Hannon, 1980).

Thus, there are good reasons to assume that individual school reports provide a conservative measure of transfers. We have already considered reasons for assuming that the MSR method provides



BEST COPY AVAILABLE



a conservative estimate. As the MSR method indicates a two-year total of approximately 1750 transfers, a more realistic estimate would be at least 2000.

By the third year of desegregation, 1976, the rush to Catholic schools had apparently subsided. No schools showed an MSR $\geq$ 1.06. Individual school reports indicate a loss of Boston residents from Catholic schools in 1976 -- a gain of 75 Boston residents in the near suburbs and a total loss of 494 in Catholic schools in the city. Also in 1976 enrollments in the entire archdiocesan system began to decline in a manner consistent with the period prior to 1974 (see Table 1).

There have been several attempts to measure the overall extent of white flight in Boston. Careful examination of enrollment trends before and after the implementation of the desegregation order suggests a total loss of between 5,000 and 10,000 white students from the public school system, almost all within the first two years (Rossell, 1977). Two thousand transfers to the Catholic school system accounted for 20% to 40% of this outmigration.

The significance of these findings for the white-flight debate is threefold. First, the desegregation/busing program did promote white flight to Catholic schools in Boston and its suburbs. Second, this phenomenon was limited to the first two years of the program. Finally, the extent of pupil transfers to Catholic schools has an ambiguous impact on any evaluation of the success of the desegregation program. Indeed, for those who support the use of mandatory busing where necessary to implement desegregation, transfers to private schools may be seen as the lesser of two evils. They do constitute a loss to the public school system, but

the loss is much more reversible than that effected by residential relocation. In addition, to the extent that white flight takes the form of private school transfers rather than the suburban relocation of white families, the criticism of school desegregation as a source of residential segregation is proportionately undermined.

These findings have additional meaning for those concerned with policy development within the Church and for those engaged in the formation of desegregation programs in other locations. For these purposes an analysis of the decision-making processes of the Boston Church may be particularly useful.

## Political and Institutional Constraints on Church Action

The Boston Church faced several sets of crosspressures which severly constrained an institutional course of action in the desegregation process. Serious constraints resulted from both external, or political, pressures which affected policy development and internal, institutional factors which shaped both policy development and implementation.

External pressures were very strong in terms of both support and opposition to the court order. Pro-desegregation influences included: the legitimate authority of the federal court; the expectations and demands of the minority community; the pressure exerted by liberal Catholics in various parts of the archdiocese; and the attention of the liberal press, represented primarily by the city's major newspaper, the Boston Globe.

Powerful counter-pressure resulted from the overwhelming opposition of the white population of Boston, most of whom are





Catholics; the nearly unanimous condemnation of the court order by local politicians; and the influence of the conservative press at the city and neighborhood level. Additional negative constraints included the lack of policy consensus at the federal level, represented by criticisms of the court order offered in the Fall of 1974 by President Ford and Senators Ervin and Baker. Dissensus in the academic community was also an important factor, as evidenced by Professor James S. Coleman's celebrity status in Boston in the Summer of 1975 after his submission of his white flight findings to the federal court in an affidavit on behalf of the anti-busing Boston Home and School Association. And finally, the limited application of the court order to the city limits infuriated city residents and exacerbated class tensions between them and immune suburbanites, including Judge Garrity and the editors of the Boston Globe, who could apparently afford to adopt a liberal position on mandatory busing and simultaneously condem anti-busing Bostonians as racists.

Although many observers were aware of these external crosspressures, desgregation proponents hoped that internal consistencies would provide clear direction for the institutional Church which had not hesitated to take unpopular positions on other moral issues. And they expected that the hierarchical structure of the Church would facilitate implementation of Church policies throughout the parishes of the diocese. However, four forms of internal constraints also operated in cross-pressure fashion, in terms of both policy development and implementation.

First, there were conflicting theological constraints, the residue of historical crosspressures which had shaped previous

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Church teachings. Catholic teachings on the obedience owed to legitimate civil authority argued for enthusiastic support of the court order. Teachings on racial justice were also consistent with Church assistance to the desegregation process. However, there are also longstanding Catholic teachings on the rights of the family, held as prior to the rights of the state, particularly in regard to the education of children. These could logically mitigate support for a desegregation plan which included mandatory busing and in fact were often cited by Catholic parents and politicians who maintained firm opposition to the court order. Church teaching on the importance of Catholic education also weighed in on the opposition side, particularly in regard to enforcement of the transfer policies. And the dilemma which Thomas O'Dea (1966) describes as "conversion vs. coercion" added another negative weight. What could be gained if Chuch leaders tried to force support for desegregation on unwilling members? At least since Vatican II coercion has not been the style of the teaching Church which has greater fear of further defections than of the milder forms of heterodoxy.

Second, congregational constraints affected goal determination and policy development. The Boston Church is overwhelmingly white, particularly among the clergy and religious women. This congregational composition served to make the institutional Church more conscious of the serious problems of working-class whites enraged by the court order than of the ongoing grievances of the black community. A more subtle congregational constraint derived from the compulsory celibacy of the Roman Catholic priesthood. Clergy ordered to enforce transfer policies were obviously unable to lead by example, to share the fears and burdens of their parishioners





by putting their own children on a bus to travel cross-town to a desegregated neighborhood school.

The third set of internal constraints was primarily organizational. These had their greatest impact on policy implementation. One critical organizational constraint was the size of the archdiocese -- two million Catholics, over four hundred active priests and one hundred fifty parishes. A bishop in such a diocese is hardly able to function as a familiar pastor. This perforce makes it very difficult for him to ask for popular support based on personal loyalty and affection when he feels forced to take an unpopular stand on an important issue. Organizational control becomes equally difficult. The inability to closely monitor compliance with the transfer policies was, in part, a function of diocesan size.

Similar constraints resulted from the concentration of power at the very top of the organizational hierarchy. In Boston very little of the archbishop's near total authority was delegated to intermediate bodies or individuals. The Board of Education was closely controlled by Cardnial Medeiros, who served as Board president. Other intermediate bodies such as the Priests' Senate and the Human Rights Commission were not empowered to act for the Church and functioned only as advisiors to the Archbishop. As a consequence there were no clear input channels at the diocesan level for clergy and laity who sought to influence policy development or simply present their own positions. This led to little sense of policy ownership among clergy and laity and limited the motivation of many parish priests to enforce compliance with the policies. The absence of empowered intermediate bodies also prevented successful



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

planning in anticipation of desegregation. No individual or group had clear responsibility for developing advance policies and educational programs. Not suprisingly, none were developed.

The fourth and final constraint was that which is peculiar to each diocese: the personal history, qualitities and leadership style of the bishop. In very few organizations are the personal characterisitics of the leader as important as in a Catholic diocese. The bishop is the wild card who can minimize or increase the restrictive power of external and internal constraints. In Boston Cardinal Medeiros was unable to provide charismatic leadership, even within the limits imposed by organizational size, partly becuase he is seen as an outsider and partly becuase of his personal style. He is an outsider because he was never a priest of the Boston archdiocese and because of his ethnic background. A Portuguese-American born in the Azores, he is the first Boston archbishop not of Irish descent since 1844. In addition, he bears the burden of having been chosen to succeed the very popular Richard Cardinal Cushing, South Boston born and bred. He also lives on a rather palatial estate at the edge of the city and lacks the gregarious and assertive self-confidence of his predecessor which minimized the effects of such residential isolation from the urban poor and working class. When faced with vociferous opposition from some disaffected Catholics during the desegregation crisis, Cardinal Medeios' uncertainty as to the degree of support he could expect from clergy and laity contributed to the reactive stance of archdiocesan leadership and, in particular, to the liberalization of the transfer policy.



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Future Implications

Boston is fairly typical of several major cities such as Chicago and New York which still face the desegregation of their public school systems. Advocates and planners must consider the likely response of the Church in these other locations. Church members and leaders in these cities must also consider how to develop a coherent and consistent institutional position.

It is very likely that the response of the Church in any location will be constrained by the external factors which were salient in the case of Boston: the source and content of the desegregation plan, the geographical extent of its application, the proportion of Catholics in the general population, and the political climate in the community.

Church members and officials who desire a supportive and consistent desgregation policy would do well to focus on the following tasks:

1. The early identification of empowered intermediate bodies responsible for the development and implementation of various aspects of a desegregation policy.
2. The development of input mechanisms whereby clergy and laity can express their fears as well as their opinions concerning desegregation and an appropriate Church response.
3. The development of an education program to precede the resolution of any desegregation court case or administrative decision. Such a program could clarify the theological issues as well as provide accurate information on relevant legal issues, the extent and effect of segregation in the public

school system, and the practical, daily implications of desegregation and mandatory busing. Members of the Church in Boston and other cities with desegregated public school systems would be valuable resources for such programs.

At the national level the Church continues lobbying efforts for tuition tax credits for parents of private school students. Such proposals for tax credits and voucher systems have gained support within the Reagan administration. If the Church is to exercise effective leadership in support of public school desegregation as it lobbies for tuition tax credits, it must defend itself against the familiar charges of hypocrisy in two different ways. Church officials at various levels must design and enforce reasonable and consistent transfer policies which restrict white flight from desegregated public schools. At the same time they must accelerate efforts to increase minority enrollments in their own systems.

Currently, social scientists and policy makers are engaged in a vigorous debate over the possible effects of tax credits and voucher plans on minority enrollments in private schools (see Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, 1981; Catterall and Levin, 1982; Taeuber and James, 1982). Whatever the outcome of the policy debate, it is certain that most Catholic schools face many changes before they can be truly and effectively integrated (see Forehand and Ragosta, 1976; Orfield, 1976). Lack of advance planning has crippled Church efforts regarding desegregation in the past. For the future to be well met, the present agenda should include development of the special competencies necessary to meet the challenges and opportunities of integrated education, active efforts at minority recruitment, and preparation of a coherent, practical and supportive

stance toward public school desegregati



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

TABLE 1: HISTORY OF ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOL SYSTEM OF ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON

| | Number of Schools | | | Enrollment | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Elementary | Secondary | Total | Elementary | Secondary | Total |
| 1954 | 224 | 93 | 317 | 107,027 | 24,120 | 131,147 |
| 1955 | 227 | 92 | 319 | 108,957 | 25,090 | 134,047 |
| 1956 | 231 | 93 | 324 | 109,898 | 26,295 | 136,193 |
| 1957 | 235 | 94 | 329 | 111,588 | 27,914 | 139,502 |
| 1958 | 242 | 96 | 338 | 114,798 | 29,170 | 143,968 |
| 1959 | 243 | 98 | 341 | 117,768 | 30,205 | 147,973 |
| 1960 | 245 | 98 | 343 | 118,847 | 31,496 | 150,343 |
| 1961 | 243 | 99 | 342 | 118,637 | 32,708 | 151,345 |
| 1962 | 243 | 99 | 342 | 118,540 | 33,489 | 152,029 |
| 1963 | 245 | 101 | 346 | 118,876 | 34,297 | 153,173 |
| 1964 | 246 | 99 | 345 | 119,635 | 33,709 | 153,344 |
| 1965 | 251 | 99 | 350 | 118,140 | 33,422 | 151,562 |
| 1966 | 246 | 96 | 342 | 115,141 | 33,514 | 148,655 |
| 1967 | 245 | 93 | 338 | 110,216 | 33,521 | 143,737 |
| 1968 | 242 | 91 | 333 | 103,259 | 32,532 | 135,791 |
| 1969 | 235 | 86 | 321 | 93,176 | 31,420 | 124,596 |
| 1970 | 221 | 76 | 297 | 81,705 | 28,124 | 109,829 |
| 1971 | 210 | 67 | 277 | 73,999 | 26,596 | 100,595 |
| 1972 | 202 | 65 | 267 | 66,702 | 26,535 | 93,237 |
| 1973 | 185 | 60 | 245 | 58,935 | 25,834 | 84,769 |
| *1974 | 187 | 61 | 248 | 55,617 | 25,923 | 81,540 |
| 1975 | 177 | 59 | 236 | 54,492 | 25,636 | 80,128 |
| 1976 | 177 | 59 | 236 | 52,263 | 25,246 | 77,509 |
| 1977 | 171 | 59 | 230 | 50,003 | 24,981 | 74,984 |
| 1978 | 167 | 58 | 225 | 47,585 | 24,431 | 72,016 |
| 1979 | 165 | 56 | 221 | 46,936 | 24,556 | 71,492 |

*First year of desegregation and mandatory busing.

TABLE 2: MEAN SURVIVAL RATIOS/SURPLUS STUDENT COUNTS OF SCHOOLS IN APPARENT VIOLATION: YEAR 1 (1974)

| School | Mean S.R. (1973-1974) | Estimated Number of Surplus Students |
|---|---|---|
| **Boston Elementary** | | |
| 1. St. Augustine, So. Boston | 1.09 | 14 |
| 2. St. Columbkille, Brighton | 1.09 | 34 |
| **Boston Secondary** | | |
| 3. Cardinal Cushing, H.S., So. Boston | 1.09 | 35 |
| | Boston Total | 83 |
| **Suburban Secondary** | | |
| 4. No. Cambridge Catholic, Cambridge | 1.33 | 41 |
| **Suburban Elementary** | | |
| 5. Mt. Alvernia, Newton | 1.55 | 89 |
| 6. St. Mary, Brookline | 1.33 | 95 |
| 7. Little Flower, Somerville | 1.21 | 57 |
| 8. Our Lady, Everett | 1.11 | 14 |
| 9. St. Rose, Chelsea | 1.10 | 33 |
| 10. St. Mary, Quincy | 1.10 | 19 |
| 11. Rosary, Watertown | 1.09 | 4 |
| 12. Sacred Heart, Weymouth | 1.09 | 36 |
| 13. St. Catherine, Norwood | 1.09 | 50 |
| 14. St. Anthony, Everett | 1.09 | 14 |
| Suburban Total | | 452 |
| Boston Total | | 83 |
| Metropolitan Total | | 535 |

TABLE 3: MEAN SURVIVAL RATIOS/SURPLUS STUDENT COUNTS OF SCHOOLS IN APPARENT VIOLATION: YEAR 2 (1974-1975)

| School | Mean S.R. (1974-1975) | Surplus Students (Total Gr. 2-8 1975 Total Gr. 1-7 1974) |
|---|---|---|
| **Boston Elementary** | | |
| 1. St. Brigid, So. Boston | 1.19 | 56 |
| 2. St. John, No. End | 1.16 | 24 |
| 3. St. Anthony, Allston | 1.16 | 48 |
| 4. Our Lady of Presentation, Brighton | 1.15 | 54 |
| 5. St. Anthony, No. End | 1.13 | 22 |
| 6. St. Columbkille, Brighton | 1.09 | 17 |
| **Boston Secondary** | | |
| 7. Cardinal Cushing H.S., So. Boston | 1.09 | 28 |
| | | 249 |
| **Suburban Secondary** | | |
| 8. Mt. Alvernia H.S., Newton | 1.10 | 7 |
| **Suburban Elementary** | | |
| 9. St. Anthony, Somerville | 1.86 | 139 |
| 10. St. Stanislaus, Chelsea | 1.47 | 67 |
| 11. Rosary, Watertown | 1.45 | 55 |
| 12. Little Flower, Somerville | 1.36 | 117 |
| 13. St. Patrick, Watertown | 1.31 | 64 |
| 14. Newton Catholic Elementary | 1.24 | 69 |
| 15. St. Joseph, Needham | 1.23 | 61 |
| 16. Immaculate Conception, Malden | 1.21 | 85 |
| 17. St. John, Newton | 1.20 | 21 |
| 18. St. Mary, Brookline | 1.17 | 50 |
| 19. St. Anthony, Everett | 1.16 | 22 |
| 20. St. Joseph, Quincy | 1.14 | 21 |
| 21. St. Catherine, Norwood | 1.14 | 77 |
| 22. Immaculate Conception, Everett | 1.12 | 29 |
| 23. St. Ann, Somerville | 1.11 | 33 |
| 24. Cheverus, Malden | 1.10 | 26 |
| 25. St. Polycarp, Somerville | 1.10 | 22 |
| | Suburban Total | 965 |
| | Boston Total | 249 |
| | Metropolital Total | 1214 |

APPENDIX I

# Map of Archdiocese of Boston




**Square Miles — 2,465**

**Counties of Essex, Middlesex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Plymouth, in the State of Massachusetts, (the towns of Mattapoisett, Marion and Wareham excepted.)**

**CATHOLIC POPULATION—2,026,247; Priests: Diocesan—1,377, Religious Orders—897; Parishes: Latin—402; Eastern Rites—8; Missions: 19; Brothers: 224; Sisters: 4,997; Religious Orders (Priests, Brothers, Sisters): 116; Colleges: 7; Parochial Elementary Schools: 143; Diocesan Elementary School: 1; Private Elementary Schools: 8; Parochial Secondary Schools: 21; Diocesan Secondary Schools: 13; Private Secondary Schools: 21; Institutional Schools: 1; Special Schools: 7; Secretarial Schools: 1; Juniorates: 1; Educational Clinics: 2; Schools of Nursing: 3; Montessori Schools: 4; Kindergarten & Nurseries: 8; Offices, Catholic Social Services: 14; Nursing and Health Services: 4; Community Centers: 9; Public Chapels and Shrines: 20; Guidance Centers: 4; Hospitals: 8; Homes (Aged, Children, Convalescent): 13; Residence (Men, Women, Clergy): 6; Retreat Houses: 14; Retreat Leagues: 1; Seminaries: 1 Diocesan Major; 1 National Major; Religious Order Houses which grant Degrees: 8; TV Chapels 1.**



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

## REFERENCES


Armor, David J.
1972"The evidence on busing." The Public Interest 28 (Summer):90-126
1980"White flight and the future of desegregation." In Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. Feagin (eds.), Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Plenum.

Catterall, James S. and Henry M. Levin
1982"Public and private schools: Evidence on tuition tax credits." Sociology of Education 55.

Clotfelter, Charles T.
1976"School desegregation, 'tipping', and private school enrollment." Journal of Human Resources XI:1:29-50.
1979"Urban school desegregation and changes in white enrollment: A re-examination." Journal of Urban Economics 6.

Coleman, James S., Thomas Hoffer and Sally Kilgore
1981Public and Private Schools. A report to the National Center for Educational Statistics. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center.

Coleman, James S., Sara D. Kelly, and John A. Moore
1975Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973. Washington: The Urban Institute.

Farley, Reynolds
1975"Racial integration in public schools, 1967 to 1972: Assessing the effect of governmental policies." Sociological Focus 8:3-26.
1976"Is Coleman Right?" Social Policy 6:1-10.

Farley, Reynolds, Toni Richards and Clarence Wurdock
1980"School desegregation and white flight: An investigation of competing models and their discrepant findings." Sociology of Education 53:123-139.

Forehand, G.A., and M. Ragosta
1976A Handbook for Integrated Schooling. Washington: Government Printing Office

Giles, Michael W., Douglas S. Gatlin and Everett F. Cataldo
1974"The impact of busing on white flight." Social Science Quarterly 55:2 (September): 493-501.

Hannon, James T.
1980The Catholic Church and School Desegregation in Boston. Unpublished M.S. Thesis. The University of Wisconsin-Madison.

O'Dea, Thomas
1966"Five dilemmas in the institutionalization of religion" in The Sociology of Religion. Englewood: Prentice-Hall.

Orfield, Gary
1975"How to make desegregation work: The adaptation of schools to their newly-integrated student bodies." Law and Contemporary Problems 29 (2).

Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Robert L. Green
1976"School desegregation in large cities: A critique of the Coleman 'white flight' thesis." Harvard Education Review 46:1-53.

Ravitch, Diane
1978"The 'white flight' controversy." The Public Interest 51 (Spring):135-149.

Rossell, Christine H.
1977"Boston's desegregation and white flight." Integrated Education (Jan/Feb).

Taeuber, Karl E. and David S. James
1982"Racial segregation among public and private schools." Sociology of Education 55.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1975Transcript of hearings in Boston, June 1975 (unpublished).